- Murena, tome 9, Les épines ;
- La jeunesse de Thorgal, tome 1, Les trois soeurs Minkelsönn.
2013-06-30
Lectures de juin 2013
2013-06-26
#SCOTUS rules that #DOMA is unconstitutional
In United States v. Windsor decision of 26 June 2013, Supreme Court rules that Defense of marriage act (DOMA) is unconstitutional :
"DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 13–26.
(a) By history and tradition the definition and regulation of marriage has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States. Congress has enacted discrete statutes to regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy, but DOMA, with a directive applicable to over 1,000 federal statues and the whole realm of federal regulations, has a far greater reach. Its operation is also directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to protect. Assessing the validity of that intervention requires discussing the historical and traditional extent of state power and authority over marriage.
Subject to certain constitutional guarantees, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, “regulation of domestic relations” is “an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States,” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 404. The significance of state responsibilities for the definition and regulation of marriage dates to the Nation’s beginning; for “when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States,” Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379, 383–384. Marriage laws may vary from State to State, but they are consistent within each State.
DOMA rejects this long-established precept. The State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. But the Federal Government uses the state-defined class for the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and disabilities. The question is whether the resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment, since what New York treats as alike the federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect. New York’s actions were a proper exercise of its sovereign authority. They reflect both the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality. Pp. 13–20.
(b) By seeking to injure the very class New York seeks to protect, DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534–535. DOMA cannot survive under these principles. Its unusual deviation from the tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of a class recognized and protected by state law. DOMA’s avowed purpose and practical effect are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enterinto same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.
DOMA’s history of enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence. BLAG’s arguments are just as candid about the congressional purpose. DOMA’s operation in practice confirms this purpose. It frustrates New York’s objective of eliminating inequality by writing inequality into the entire United States Code.
DOMA’s principal effect is to identify and make unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages. It contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of their State, but not others, of both rights and responsibilities, creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State. It also forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect. Pp. 20–26.
699 F. 3d 169, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined as to Part I. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts II and III."
Source : SCOTUS Syllabus
In Hollingsworth et al. v. Perry et al., 26 June 2013, the Supreme Court also rules that :
"Petitioners defending Proposition 8's constitutionality did not have standing to appeal the District Court’s order" (which enjoined the public officials named as defendants from enforcing the law, which the said court had declared unconstitutional).
Source : SCOTUS Syllabus
"DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 13–26.
(a) By history and tradition the definition and regulation of marriage has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States. Congress has enacted discrete statutes to regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy, but DOMA, with a directive applicable to over 1,000 federal statues and the whole realm of federal regulations, has a far greater reach. Its operation is also directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to protect. Assessing the validity of that intervention requires discussing the historical and traditional extent of state power and authority over marriage.
Subject to certain constitutional guarantees, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, “regulation of domestic relations” is “an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States,” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 404. The significance of state responsibilities for the definition and regulation of marriage dates to the Nation’s beginning; for “when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States,” Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379, 383–384. Marriage laws may vary from State to State, but they are consistent within each State.
DOMA rejects this long-established precept. The State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. But the Federal Government uses the state-defined class for the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and disabilities. The question is whether the resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment, since what New York treats as alike the federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect. New York’s actions were a proper exercise of its sovereign authority. They reflect both the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality. Pp. 13–20.
(b) By seeking to injure the very class New York seeks to protect, DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534–535. DOMA cannot survive under these principles. Its unusual deviation from the tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of a class recognized and protected by state law. DOMA’s avowed purpose and practical effect are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enterinto same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.
DOMA’s history of enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence. BLAG’s arguments are just as candid about the congressional purpose. DOMA’s operation in practice confirms this purpose. It frustrates New York’s objective of eliminating inequality by writing inequality into the entire United States Code.
DOMA’s principal effect is to identify and make unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages. It contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of their State, but not others, of both rights and responsibilities, creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State. It also forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect. Pp. 20–26.
699 F. 3d 169, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined as to Part I. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts II and III."
Source : SCOTUS Syllabus
In Hollingsworth et al. v. Perry et al., 26 June 2013, the Supreme Court also rules that :
"Petitioners defending Proposition 8's constitutionality did not have standing to appeal the District Court’s order" (which enjoined the public officials named as defendants from enforcing the law, which the said court had declared unconstitutional).
Source : SCOTUS Syllabus
2013-06-14
Harm principale : principe de nuisance
"Le but de cet essai est de proclamer un principe très-simple, comme
fondé à régir absolument la conduite de la société envers l’individu,
dans tout ce qui est contrainte et contrôle, que les moyens employés
soient la force physique, sous forme de peines légales, ou la coaction
morale de l’opinion publique. Voici ce principe : le seul objet qui
autorise les hommes, individuellement ou collectivement, à troubler la
liberté d’action d’aucun de leurs semblables, est la protection de
soi-même. La seule raison légitime que puisse avoir une communauté pour
user de force contre un de ses membres, est de l’empêcher de nuire aux
autres. Elle n’en a pas une raison suffisante dans le bien de cet
individu, soit physique, soit moral.
"Un homme ne peut pas, en bonne justice, être obligé d’agir ou de
s’abstenir, parce que ce serait meilleur pour lui, parce que cela le
rendrait plus heureux, ou parce que, dans l’opinion des autres, ce
serait sage ou même juste. Ce sont de bonnes raisons pour lui faire des
remontrances, pour raisonner avec lui, pour le convaincre ou pour le
supplier, mais non pour le contraindre ou pour lui causer aucun dommage,
s’il passe outre. Pour justifier cela, il faudrait que la conduite
qu’on veut détourner cet homme de tenir, eût pour objet de nuire à
quelqu’autre. La seule partie de la conduite de l’individu pour laquelle
il soit justiciable de la société, est ce qui concerne les autres. Pour
ce qui n’intéresse que lui, son indépendance est, de droit, absolue.
Sur lui-même, sur son corps et sur son esprit, l’individu est souverain."
- John Stuart Mill, De la liberté
2013-06-01
Non à #Cigeo, non à l'enfouissement des déchets nucléaires à #Bure
Le stockage souterrain de déchets nucléaires à Bure en Lorraine est un projet insensé, aux conséquences catastrophiques pour les générations à venir, et le fruit d'une succession d'impostures.
-
Il devait y avoir plusieurs sites de recherche, il n'y en a qu'un
seul en exploitation.
-
Il devait s'agir d'un lieu d'études, ce sera un lieu de stockage.
-
Le stockage devait être réversible, il ne le sera pas.
-
Le stockage devrait être étanche et stable, il ne peut pas l'être à l'échelle géologique.
Ôter
les déchets de la vue, dans une zone relativement peu peuplée, en déversant des
subventions et des promesses d'emploi pour acheter le consentement
des populations locales, ne supprime pas le problème du devenir de
ces déchets, qui subsistent à des échelles de temps qui dépassent
la durée des sociétés humaines, et auront un impact et un coût
qui dépassent l'échelle locale.
Enfouir les déchets rend leur
gestion plus complexe qu'un stockage en surface, qui nous oblige en
outre à nous en préoccuper, davantage que s'ils sont cachés sous
le tapis.
Les expériences étrangères ne sont pas concluantes :
le cas de la mine d'Asse en Allemagne est l'illustration caricaturale
des dangers auxquels nous nous exposons par notre propre faute, en
enfouissant les déchets, ce qui est une manière assez puérile de
traiter le problème. Et un puits sans fonds financier, au demeurant.
L'enfouissement n'est certainement pas une solution rationnelle, et si la société
française fait le choix, contrairement à d'autres pays européens (Allemagne, Autriche, Italie, Suisse, etc.), de poursuivre l'exploitation de la filière
nucléaire civile dans le cadre de son mélange d'approvisionnement
énergétique, la seule issue est dans la recherche, sur le
traitement en surface des déchets, sur la surgénération et à plus
long terme sur la fusion.
Ce sujet est autrement plus grave et sérieux que celui de l’implantation d'éoliennes ou de panneaux solaires, qui fait pourtant beaucoup plus de
bruit. Bien que le site ne soit éloigné que de 70 km de l'aire urbaine de Nancy (435 000 habitants), le projet ne semble pas la première préoccupation des élus écologistes et Verts lorrains. Ne laissons ni les intérêts de l'Andra, ni le temps (22 ans depuis la loi Bataille) venir à bout de l'opposition à cette mauvaise solution.
Non à Cigéo, non à l'enfouissement des déchets nucléaires
à Bure en Lorraine.
Liens :
- billet du blog Verdun - Bienvenue en Meuse
- Transatomic Power : une solution de recyclage des déchets nucléaires
- documentaire Under control sur la décision allemande de fermer en 2022
- Centrales nucléaires : démantèlement impossible ? (VOD) ; le documentaire sera diffusé le 6 juin 2013 à 9 heures sur Arte
- documentaire Under control sur la décision allemande de fermer en 2022
- Centrales nucléaires : démantèlement impossible ? (VOD) ; le documentaire sera diffusé le 6 juin 2013 à 9 heures sur Arte
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